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This installment of Law and the Public’s Health examines the meaning of Olmstead v. L.C.1 for public health
agencies administering personal health care programs.
Handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999,
Olmstead was a landmark decision that interpreted the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act) as it
applies to public programs and thus is of great relevance to many public health agencies. Following an
overview of the decision and its interpretation by lower
federal courts, this column concludes with a discussion of the implications of Olmstead and its progeny
for public health policy and practice.
THE OLMSTEAD DECISION
At the heart of the Olmstead decision lies the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of two intertwined and fundamental legal concepts under the ADA that determine
when a court can intervene on behalf of persons with
disabilities covered by the Act and order a public agency
to alter its programs and services. Under the ADA,
courts can order public agencies to make “reasonable
modifications” to its programs; however, the modifications may not amount to “fundamental alterations” of
the programs, since these types of changes lie beyond
the reach of what courts can require and thus are
matters for the legislative reform process.
The Olmstead case began in Georgia when two
women, both of whom were institutionalized in a state
inpatient psychiatric hospital, sued the state for failure
to provide them with services in a more integrated
setting, which they alleged was required under the
ADA. The staff of the state institution had deemed
community-based services appropriate for both women,
and Georgia’s Medicaid agency operated a “homeand community-based waiver” program that provided
community-based health care and support services for
persons deemed at risk of institutionalization. However, of the 2,109 slots approved under the federal
waiver program, the legislature funded only 700, leav-

ing Georgia’s Medicaid agency unable to fill some twothirds of the slots; other persons eligible for the waiver
program remained institutionalized and were put on a
waiting list for community services. The plaintiffs alleged that their unnecessary institutionalization violated
the ADA and sought immediate community placement.
It was in this context that the Supreme Court explored in Olmstead the tension between reasonable
modifications and fundamental alterations under the
ADA. The Court began by reviewing Title II of the Act,
which prohibits discrimination or exclusion of any
“qualified individual with a disability” by public programs.2 (The two plaintiffs were “qualified” for the
program at issue as defined by the ADA because their
mental impairments significantly affected activities of
daily life and they were eligible for Medicaid.) Title II
and its implementing rules require public entities to
make “reasonable modifications”3 to their programs
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability and to
offer their services in the “most integrated setting”4
appropriate to the needs of qualified persons with
disabilities. At the same time, however, the Act limits
the reach of the “reasonable modification” requirement, providing that no modification is required if
“the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program, or activity.”5
The Court ruled that medically unjustifiable institutionalization of disabled individuals constitutes an ADA
violation. Concluding that the power to decide the
medical appropriateness of institutional care resides
with state employees, the Court also held that agencies must make reasonable modifications to achieve
integration in programs and services. The Court refused to establish a “bright line” test for what changes
are reasonable as opposed to fundamental because
such questions involve a complex determination of
fact for courts to determine. At the same time, the
Court set out the evidentiary matters that lower courts
should consider in Title II reasonable modification/
fundamental alteration cases, including evidence of a
“comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing
qualified persons . . . in less restrictive settings and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the state’s endeavors to keep the institutions
fully populated.”6 The Court also held that in determining the magnitude of its remedial obligation toward any particular individual seeking a modification,
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a state can appropriately weigh the welfare of the entire “class” to which the individual belongs (in this
case, the group of mentally disabled individuals in
Georgia’s Medicaid program), and this includes “taking
into account the resources available to the [s]tate. . . .”7
Finally, the Court clarified that the burden of proof
lay with the state to show that a requested change
would fundamentally alter a program and therefore
lie beyond the power of the courts to order.
In sum, Olmstead set out a complex test for determining when public agencies must make changes in
their programs in order to achieve community integration of qualified persons with disabilities. Federal
guidance issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) in the wake of the decision
clarifies that the case applies to all persons with disabilities, not only those with mental disabilities.8 The
guidance also establishes general standards for planning.8 Congress and the Bush Administration also have
developed a series of health care, employment, education and training, and housing initiatives that are aimed
at supporting state efforts to integrate persons with
disabilities into community settings.9
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION IN A
POST-OLMSTEAD ENVIRONMENT
The standards established by the Court for identifying
the circumstances when courts can order modifications in their programs are by no means crystal clear.
As is the case with many major Supreme Court decisions involving social policy, the critical issue thus becomes how lower courts reconcile the competing principles in Olmstead: on the one hand, the Court’s ruling
that medically unjustified institutionalization is illegal
under the ADA and must be remedied through appropriate integration; on the other, the Court’s deference
to states’ medical discretion and affirmative defenses.
Three post-Olmstead cases—all of which involved
disabled individuals eligible for their states’ Medicaid
program—are instructive in terms of how courts have
analyzed Olmstead’s competing principles. In each case,
the court’s decision appears to depend on whether
the court views the plaintiff’s request as one to change
a program’s essential design or character or merely as
one to change program administration. When a court
concludes that a case involves program design, it classifies the request as a fundamental alteration and therefore appropriately handled not by the courts, but
through the legislative process. When, however, a case
is viewed as raising matters of discrimination in program administration, the request is viewed as simply

one for a reasonable modification and therefore within
the purview of a court to order.
For example, soon after Olmstead was decided, a
federal court of appeals ruled in Rodriguez v. City of
New York 10 that efforts by individuals with mental disabilities to secure “safety monitoring” services in their
homes amounted to a request for a change in Medicaid program design. The state covered safety monitoring when tied to a physical care service in the home
but not as a freestanding service. As a result, the court
concluded that it did not have the power to alter an
expansion of coverage and that plaintiffs were seeking
a “new benefit.”11
Two recent community integration cases also at the
federal appellate level preserve the Rodriguez rule that
changes in what constitutes a covered Medicaid benefit under a state plan amount to a “fundamental alteration”; at the same time, these decisions make clear
that some courts may be willing to adopt a more “global” analytic approach to Medicaid coverage when
examining community integration claims. Rather than
focusing on specific categories of medical assistance
services and benefits included in a state plan (e.g.,
nursing home services; home- and community-based
care services), a court may instead frame the request
as one to modify an already covered generic long-term
care benefit, particularly when there is evidence that
the state already covers the services for persons in the
plaintiffs’ class. Viewed this way, changes in Medicaid
coverage become matters of administration (and therefore, subject to the reasonable modification rule) rather
than of program design.
This “global” approach to analyzing community integration claims can be seen in Townsend v. Quasim,12 a
case in which a group of medically needy Medicaid
recipients sued the state of Washington under the
ADA over a distinction in how it structured the longterm care services offered under its plan. Categorically needy persons were entitled to both institutional
and home care, but the medically needy could receive
only institutional care. The plaintiffs were persons receiving home care whose very modest income increases
(approximately $35.00 per month) flipped them from
categorically needy to medically needy status. On the
basis of this change, they were ordered into institutions.
Rather than framing the case as one that concerned
benefit design, the court characterized the case as one
that involved Medicaid “long-term care” administration:
Characterizing community-based provision of services
as a new program of services not currently provided by
the state fails to account for the fact that the state is
already providing those very same services. If services
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were determined to constitute distinct programs based
solely on the location in which they were provided,
Olmstead and the integration regulation would be
effectively gutted. . . .13

Essentially, according to the court, the plaintiffs’
claim simply was a request to move the location of
long-term care services covered under the state plan,
and thus it amounted to a request for a reasonable
modification in how the state administered its Medicaid program.
The “global” approach to analyzing community integration claims similarly underpinned the decision in
Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority,14 which involved
restrictions on prescription drug coverage for outpatients but not for nursing home residents. The court
in Fisher concluded that claimants “are not demanding
a separate service or one not already provided by the
state,”15 but rather a potential mere change in how the
state was administering its prescription drug benefit.
Importantly, the Fisher court also noted that “. . .[i]f
every alteration in a program or service that required
an outlay of funds were tantamount to a fundamental
alteration, the ADA’s integration mandate would be
hollow indeed. . . .”15
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
POLICY AND PRACTICE
In both Quasim and Fisher, the facts were particularly
important, since both cases involved community residents who faced immediate institutionalization because
of program choices made by Medicaid agencies. The
cases can be read as evidence of courts’ willingness to
look beyond Medicaid’s detailed statutory structure in
order to ensure that states are investing their considerable outlays in long-term care in order to achieve
integration. Quasim and Fisher further suggest that if a
state is covering and paying for specific services under
its state plan but has configured the benefits so as to
cause inappropriate institutionalization for certain
groups of beneficiaries, a court may not accept a “coverage design” defense as the end of the matter. Nor
will courts accept as a fundamental alteration defense
the argument that changing how Medicaid programs
are administered might cost more.
These cases carry two implications for public health
policy and practice. First, for ADA enforcement purposes, it may be more appropriate to think of Medicaid as underwriting “health care” rather than specific, defined classes of benefits. For example, if a state
limits outpatient prescriptions to three per month, as
in Fisher, it may wish to consider allowing a “medical
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necessity” override of the limit to permit additional
coverage where the limit raises the risk of unnecessary
institutionalization. Similarly, states may wish to seek
Medicaid long-term care waivers from DHHS to permit greater flexibility in moving long-term care funds
between institutional care and community residence
care, as appropriate to need.
Second, the cases also appear to support the notion
of aggressive, proactive, and specific state planning in
the area of long-term care community integration.
Instead of creating legal exposure for states, active
planning that delineates the steps to be taken, establishes timetables, and creates plans for state legislatures actually appears to make courts more willing to
permit a lengthy time period for achieving the modifications themselves. For example, in Williams v. Wasserman,16 waits for community services of as long as five
years were deemed reasonable because the state of
Maryland presented strong evidence regarding its yearslong effort to restructure its long-term Medicaid program through a combination of state plan amendments and increased appropriations for community
care.
In the end, a state conducting its Olmstead-related
planning efforts might wish to focus on how Medicaid
is deployed to achieve reform in the area of long-term
care, rather than as a means of covering specific
benefits. In other words, in an ADA context, Medicaid
programs should be thought of less as a precise insurance contract and more as a means for supporting
important revisions in services and supports for persons with disabilities.
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